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1 In  theory-based  conceptions  of  categorization,  representations  of  categories  are
embedded in the individual’s background knowledge. Concepts “make sense” in the light
of this knowledge and become “mini-theories” (Keil, 1989; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994).
Characterizations  of  background  knowledge  foreground  the  role  of  the  causal  links
between features and consider these causal links to be the glue that ensures categorical
coherence. The aim of this article is to address the central question of the causal relations
between features and their role in the induction processes. 
 
The relations between features: from correlation to
causality. 
2 Since the 1970s (Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-
Braem, 1976), the question of the correlations between features has held center stage
within the theories of conceptual representations. Features are correlated if they tend to
appear together within a concept (McRae & Cree, 2002; McRae, Cree, Westmacott, & De Sa,
1999). Correlations between features include various types of relations: causal, spatial,
temporal or any other type of co-presence in the environment, such as “has feathers” and
“has a beak” in the representation of a bird. The idea of dependence relations (Sloman,
Love, & Ahn, 1998) thus refers to the set of potential relations between features. 
3 Correlations cannot be processed independently of a background of knowledge about the
categories which is acquired through experience with objects, by using them, talking or
reading about them (Cree & McRae, 2003: McRae et al., 1999; Murphy & Spalding, 1995).
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Murphy and Wisniewski (1989) postulated that a link is constructed if the correlation is
explicitly  observed  and,  at  an  even  earlier  stage,  that  knowledge  of  a  field  focuses
individuals on series of statistical correlations (Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). For
example, in the concept of a bird, "has wings" and "can fly" are more closely linked than
"has  feathers"  and "chirps".  The  role  of  a  feature  in  the  determination  of  category
membership results from the salience of the link between this feature and other features. 
4 Ahn, Marsh, Luhmann and Lee (2002) have tested the role of knowledge. These authors
tested the hypothesis that features which are explicitly recognized as being correlated
with one another are those features which individuals have theories about. Their results
suggest,  firstly,  that  in the face of  the vast  number of  possible correlations between
features, individuals tend to encode only those combinations of features which they can
explain  in  terms of  a  causal  relation.  They favor  the  interpretation that  holds  that,
wherever possible, these representations of objects consist of causal relations and that
conceptual  coherence  is  highly  dependent  on  explanatory  coherence  (see  also  Ahn,
Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995; Ahn, 1998; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rehder &
Hastie, 2001; Rips, 1989).
5 Given this conception of knowledge which is primarily set within a framework of causal
explanations,  the  relations  between  features  are  characterized  by  a  directional
asymmetry: the cause - or absence of cause - produces the effect - or absence of effect -
without the effect acting on the cause. This idea of an asymmetry which is inherent to
causal  knowledge  contrasts  with  the  formalizations  of  similarity-based  models
(Hintzman,  1986;  Medin,  &  Schaffer,  1978;  Nosofsky,  1986)  which  postulate  that
knowledge can be described in terms of  symmetrical  relations between features.  The
directional or non-directional character of the relations is all the more important when
we seek to understand inferential processes. In a bidirectional model, the presence of a
feature A makes it  possible to infer the presence of a feature B and the presence of
feature B makes it possible to infer the presence of feature A. However, even if knowing
that an animal "flies" makes it possible to deduce that it "has wings", knowing that it "has
wings"  does  not  make it  possible  to  conclude that  it  "flies".  It  would appear  that  a
formalization based on a relational asymmetry is more appropriate in accounting for the
structure  of  object  representations.  Some  authors  (Pearl,  2000;  Rehder,  2003a)  have
further noted that knowledge which is causal in nature, compared to knowledge which is
correlational in nature, is more likely to result in appropriate action in the world and
reasoning about situations. 
 
Causal Status Hypothesis
6 The Causal  Status  Hypothesis  (Ahn,  1998)  postulates  that  the  features  that  are  most
important  for  category  membership  are  those  which  possess  a  causal  status.  The
functional features of manufactured objects in Ahn's study were judged to be more causal
than  the  molecular  and  physical  features.  In  the  case  of  natural  object  categories,
molecular  features  were  judged  to  be  more  causal  than  the  functional  and  physical
features. It is therefore the causal status of a feature and not its nature that influences an
object's categorization. In Ahn's categorization task, the results were similar to those
obtained by Barton and Komatsu (1989).  Ahn suggests that a feature’s weight resides
more in its causal role than in the nature of the object to which it belongs, and that, all
other things being equal, exemplars that preserve theory-based correlations are judged
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to be better category members than exemplars that do not preserve such explainable
correlations. 
7 There are different ways of modeling the causal relations between features depending on
the  ontological  domain  in  question.  The  concept  named  “psychological  essentialism”
postulates that, for individuals, the members of the ontological category of living things
share a set of features, or essence, which determines their identity and regulates their
membership of  the category (Braisby,  Franks, & Hampton,  1996).  The features which
constitute the essence are deep and not available to perception, whereas the features
which result from the essence are external and available to perception, with the shared
essence explaining the surface resemblances  (Medin & Ortony,  1989;  Strevens,  2000).
Links  between  essence  and  external  aspects  could  be  considered  in  terms  of  causal
reasoning  within  the  biological  domain.  According  to  Rehder  (2007a),  this  type  of
reasoning consists of two steps: Individuals reason backwards from the identification of
the perceptual features to arrive at the essence and then make a decision based on it.
Children as young as 5 years of age seem to call upon their prior biological knowledge and
beliefs (Coley, Hayes, Lawson, & Moloney, 2004; Meunier & Cordier, 2009). Essentialism
presupposes a lack of sensitivity to context.
8 If the categories of living things are compatible with the belief that the individuals in
these categories possess an essence, what is the case for other types of categories, for
example manufactured objects? Unlike the reasoning applied to the categorization of
natural  objects,  the  categorization  of  manufactured  objects  would  seem  to  be
underpinned by a teleological mode of reasoning which considers that they have been
intentionally created for a given purpose (Bloom, 1998; Kelemen, 1999). The possession of
features and their importance depend on this. 
9 Some authors (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Medin, Lynch, Coley, & Atran, 1997; Ross & Murphy,
1999)  have  further  refined  these  proposals  and  postulate  that  context  also  has  an
influence  on  the  reasoning  performed  by  individuals:  When  a  natural  object  has  a
functional role in a specific activity - for a fisherman, a fish is a "product" and has the
functions  "be  sold"  or  "be  eaten"  -  its  categorization  may  be  underpinned  by  a
teleological mode of reasoning. Thus, for these authors, it is, beyond the nature of the
object  that  is  to  be  categorized,  the  functional  role  or  utility  of  this  object  in  the
individual's activity that influences the type of reasoning that guides categorization, i.e.
essentialist or teleological. 
10 In a complex network of features, a feature is rarely either a cause or an effect, but can be
both a cause of  some features and an effect  of  other features.  Within an essentialist
framework, only the distal causes are important for categorization. The same is not the
case for teleological reasoning. We may well imagine that it is important to gain a more
precise  understanding  of  the  circumstances  of  all  the  causes  (distal,  intermediate,
proximal) that are involved in a task. Taking account of the influence of the task context
may lead us to attribute greater significance to the causes which impact  directly on
judgment: the proximal causes. 
 
Causal centrality (or causal density) hypothesis
11 Rehder  (2003b)  and  Rehder  and  Hastie  (2001,  2004)  have  also  studied  the  relations
between  feature  importance  and  causality  but  have  done  so  on  the  basis  of  causal
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centrality. This places the "be the effect of" and "be the cause of" relations on the same
level and the centrality of any given feature is thus linked to the number of relations
which radiate from it. 
12 As far  as  categorization is  concerned,  is  the most  important  aspect  of  features their
causality, their causality and centrality, or merely their centrality? We have seen how the
causal status hypothesis deals with this question. In the study conducted by Rehder and
Hastie (2001), the various modalities were manipulated through the reading of short texts
in which the number and arrangement of the causal links were varied (compared to a
control text in which the described events were described as independent).The results
argue in favor of the role of causal centrality: the importance of a feature increases with
the number of relations it maintains. This led Ahn and Kim (2000) to propose the idea of
multi-determinism in which the importance of a feature is a function of both its causal
status and its causal centrality. All other things being equal, causes are more salient than
effects. However, when an effect feature is involved in a large number of causal relations,
the causal  status is  in some way "submerged" by the causal  centrality.  Nevertheless,
Rehder and Kim (2006) claim that past demonstrations of a causal status effect arose
because features were presented in their causal order. Consequently, the result may be
attributable to a “coherence effect” which confers sense on features in the light of their
causal relationships. 
13 Do the “be the effect of” and “be the cause of” relations really occupy the same level?
Redher and Burnett (2005) tested two types of causal links: the Common Cause schema
(one feature causes three other features) and the Common Effect schema (one feature is
the effect of the other three features). If we ignore the direction of the causality, the
Common  Cause  schema  and  Common  Effect  schema  are  analogous.  However,  if  the
relations are asymmetrical, and even though the two schemas imply that the causes will
be correlated with the effects, then the Common Cause schema further implies that there
will be a correlation between the different effects as a result of their common cause,
whereas the Common Effect schema does not imply any such correlation between the
causes. Rehder (2003a) has proposed an interpretation for this: in the case of a Common
Effect  schema,  the  cause  features  are  not  correlated,  but  instead  participate  in  an
“ordered interaction”, that is to say that each of the causes is weighted with reference to
the others1.  Whereas in the case of a Common Cause schema, the degree of category
membership increases as a linear function of the number of effects present, in a Common
Effect schema, some causes are more important than others: the level of membership
undoubtedly increases with the number of causes present but in a non-linear fashion.
14 The patterns revealed by the experiment conducted by Rehder and Hastie (2001) testify
not to a symmetry of causal relations but to their asymmetry since the relations between
the causes in a Common Effect schema are of a different nature from the links between
the effects in a Common Cause schema. Like Cheng's causal power theory (1997),  the
causal  theory  proposed  by  Rehder  and  Hastie  is  based  on  an  asymmetrical  and
probabilistic representation of causality. This is a generative approach in that it predicts
the presence of  links -  correlations or interactions -  between features which are not
directly linked by a causal relation. 
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Inference production
15 One important role played by concepts is to permit inductive inferences (Anderson, 1990;
Chaigneau, Barsalou, & Sloman, 2004; Heit, 2000). Inference production can be addressed
in  two  ways  using  two  different  types  of  task:  feature-  extension  or  category-based
induction tasks(Yamauchi, 2005). In a category-based induction task, one proposition is
supplied as a premise and another as a conclusion. The task is to specify whether the item
given as the conclusion possesses the same feature as the item described as the premise
and the individuals' responses depend on the similarity between the items in the premise,
the  representative  nature  of  the  items,  the  number  of  premises  that  instantiate  the
conclusion, the scope of the conclusion, and the number of accessed alternatives to the
conclusion (Heit,  2000;  Heit  & Rubinstein,  1994;  McDonald,  Samuels,  & Rispoli,  1996;
Murphy & Ross, 2005; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie,
Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1989; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). Background knowledge
would therefore play a role in determining whether or not a feature present in a member
of a category is generalized to all the members of the category. In feature extension tasks,
a proposition is supplied as a premise and the participants have to judge the relationship
between the features associated with one and the same object. For example, “this car is
very comfortable.  Does it  have leather seats?” This type of  task makes it  possible to
identify  the  features  which  are  correlated  within  one  and  the  same  concept.  An
unobserved feature can be inferred from an observed feature if these two features are
correlated  in  the  conceptual  representation.  Is  this  unobserved  feature  more  easily
inferred if it is a cause, an effect, or merely correlated? We are interested here only in
feature-extension tasks. 
 
Inference production and causal relations
16 Are features inferred more easily when their cause(s) or effect(s) are present? Rehder and
Burnett (2005) investigated this question by comparing a Common Cause condition (CC)
with a  control  condition (CT).  In  the  CC condition,  the  participants  memorized four
causally related features associated with the category: one of these features was the cause
of the other three. In the CT condition, the participants memorized the four features but
no  causal  relation  was  proposed.  The  learning  phase  was  followed  by  an  inference
production phase. The authors then proposed descriptions of exemplars some of whose
features were not mentioned. The participants had to judge whether these were absent or
present. In the CC condition, the inferences relating to the cause feature were strongly
determined  by  the  presence  or  absence  of  its  effects.  Similarly,  in  this  condition,
inferences relating to one of the effects were strongly influenced by the presence or
absence of the cause. However, when the cause was present, the probability of inferring
an effect increased with the number of effect features that were present. This suggests
that  the effects,  although thought  to  be independent  -  because they were presented
independently - were processed by the participants as being predictive of their mutual
presence. Rehder and Burnett refer to this as a non-independence effect. 
17 The Common Effect schema (CE), in which one feature is independently caused by each of
the other three features, was also tested. The results indicate that the inference regarding
the presence of a cause is influenced by the presence of the other causes even when the
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effect is absent. These results bear out one aspect of the theory of causal power proposed
by Novick and Cheng (2004)2:  a single cause is often perceived as contributing to the
production of an effect but is also thought to be insufficient to produce it alone. What
might be rendered as "hard work" does not entail success but has to be combined with
other factors such as "talent" and "opportunity". This research therefore shows, firstly,
that it is easier to infer a feature when its causes and/or its effects are present; secondly,
that the "effect  features" in a "Common Cause" schema or the "cause features" in a
"Common Effect" schema are not processed independently of one another; and, thirdly,
that these results  can be observed for various ontological  domains (manufactured or
natural objects). We can therefore hypothesize that this effect is due to the presence of
general causal knowledge independently of the ontological domains in question (Ahn,
Novick, & Kim, 2003). 
18 However, this non-independence effect was not reproduced in the study conducted by
Perales, Catena and Maldonado (2004). Their experiment called on two fictitious micro-
organisms - Ladiarium and Espiridia - which were presented as the potential causes of the
appearance of a chemical substance in the air which was the subject of biological research
(diagnostic - or Common Effect – condition). In contrast, in a predictive - or Common
Cause - condition, the proliferation of each micro-organism was described as a potential
effect of the appearance of a chemical substance. The results suggest that most of the
participants inferred the existence of a correlation between two elements which were
defined as being the effects of a common potential cause and did not infer a correlation
between  two  potential  causes  of  the  same  effect.  The  authors  consider  that  causal
directionality has an effect on the inference of the presence of a correlation here.
19 We believe that this difference in the result patterns obtained by Rehder and Burnett
(2005), on the one hand, and by Perales et al. (2004), on the other, can be explained. The
studies conducted by Rehder and Burnett did not make use of any task requiring the
inference of correlations. It was the increase in the probability of a cause being inferred
as the number of other present cause features increased in a Common Effect schema that
suggested the existence of a non-independence effect. In the experiment conducted by
Perales et  al.  (2004),  the task required the inference of  explicit  correlations between
features with the same causal status. Consequently, only the effects of one and the same
cause were explicitly linked. The indicator of correlation is either direct (Perales et al.) or
indirect (Rehder & Burnett). In some way, the format of presentation forces the reasoner
to operate on a different representational format. 
 
The inferential potential of features and the
ontological domain
20 In the framework or the Common Cause schema or Common Effect schema, inference
production  are  observed  for  various  ontological  domains,  and  could  be  due  to  the
presence  of  general  causal  knowledge,  that  can  directly  be  the  medium  of  causal
reasoning. We can underline that, methodologically, in the majority of the studies cited
here,  the material  is  constitutes of  a fictitious object  that  was described in terms of
features between which certain causal relations were or were not established. In other
respects, research on intuitive theories which focuses on existing knowledge about real
object underlines that the domains of categories (manufactured or natural objects) differ
in the way in which they support generalization (Coley et al., 2004). According to Keil
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(1989),  living  objects  possess  more  correlated  features  than  other  objects.  Thus  the
inductive potential of manufactured objects should be less than that of living objects
(Gelman,  1988).  It  seems  interesting  to  examine  in  too  much  detail  these  two
incompatible points of view. 
21 Chaigneau and Barsalou (in press) consider the difference in inductive potential not in
terms of the domain to which the object belongs but in terms of complexity: given an
equal level of complexity, living and manufactured objects would have equal inductive
potentials. Thus, the more complex an object is, denser the network of features which
underpins its conceptual organization. It seems that complexity is not the only critical
factor. The individual’s prior beliefs with regard to the domain seem equally important,
as we will show it below. 
22 Whatever the ontological domain in question, Sloman et al. (1998) suggest that certain
features have a greater inferential potential than others. According to Hadjichristidis,
Sloman, Stevenson, & Over (2004), individuals generalize a feature from a given concept
to a target concept if  they think that this candidate feature is central  for the target
concept (see also Rehder, 2006): the inferential potential of a feature would thus be a
function of  the  number  of  links  it  has  with other  features  in  this  network -  i.e.  its
centrality. Rehder (2006, 2007b), and Kim and Rehder (2007) have proposed a theory of
property generalization in which "one computes whether a novel  feature is  likely to
appear in a target category not on the basis of any one characteristic of the feature (e.g.,
its centrality), but rather on the basis of one’s beliefs about the causal laws which relate
the  feature  to  those  of  the  target  category"  (Rehder,  2007b,  p.87-88).  This  effect  is
referred  to  as  a  coherence  effect:  individuals  generalize  a  novel  feature  from a  given
concept to a target concept if they think that this candidate feature is consistent with
causal  laws.  Consequently,  the  generalization  of  a  feature  in  a  task  would  not  be
determined by the presence or absence of the causal feature in the items, but instead by
the number of violations of the causal relations expected for each of these items. Finally,
Rehder (2007b) proposes that the inductive potential of categories thought to arise from
folk  essentialism concerning  biological  types  may in  fact  arise  from a  more  general
phenomenon,  namely  theoretical  coherence,  which  potentially  applies  to  types  of
categories in addition to biological types. 
23 However,  Meunier and Cordier (2009) have shown that the coherence effect,  like the
causal status effect, is unable on its own to explain some of the choices made by 5 year-
old children. In the two studies conducted by these authors, the items which possessed an
internal causal feature exhibited one violated causal relation (the link between the internal
causal feature and the absent surface effect), whereas the items which did not possess this
internal  causal feature  exhibited  two violated  causal  relations  (the  links  between the
absent internal causal feature and each of the surface effect features). In our first study, the
preference exhibited by the 5-year-old children to choose the item with the internal causal
feature rather than the item with no such feature might be due to the fact that fewer
causal links are violated in the former than in the latter case. In contrast, when, in our
second study, a symmetrical situation was tested and the causal status was associated
with a surface feature, no causal status effect of the feature was observed. The coherence
effect is unable to explain these responses on its own and we must take the children’s
prior beliefs about essentialism into account. 
24 In the case of manufactured objects, the situation is not exactly the same. Given that the
function of an object plays a major role, does knowledge of an object's function make it
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possible to produce inferences concerning its structure? In a network of causal relations,
it would seem to be appropriate to consider this aspect to lie at the heart of a complex
relational system which brings together the object's physical structure, the action, the
situation in which it occurs, the produced events and the intention of the object's creator
(Ahn,  1998;  Chaigneau  &  Barsalou,  in  press).  We  can  thus  speak  of  the  function's
affordance as described in Gibson's theory (1977). This point of view contrasts with that
referred to as the "creator's intention" which gives this intention a higher status than
that of affordance (Bloom, 1998). For example, an object created to be a tea-pot continues
to  be  a  tea-pot  even  when  it  is  used  to  water  plants.  Chaigneau  et  al.  (2004)  have
attempted to reconcile these approaches in the HIPE model. When considering a category
of objects,  individuals can make use of their knowledge about: (a) the object’s design
history (H), (b) the object’s physical structure and the physical settings in which it is
found (P), and (c) the events that arise during the object’s use, such as agent actions,
object behaviors, and outcomes (E). On any given occasion, an agent has an intention (I)
for  conceptualizing  one  particular  sense  of  the  object’s  function  and  constructs  it
dynamically using a subset of the available knowledge. Function must be thought of as a
composite  element  (Barsalou,  1993).  This  approach  therefore  proposes  that  a  causal
model lies at the root of inferences relating to actual or imagined functions (Pearl, 2000). 
25 This  causal  model  reflects  the  individual's  dynamic  capacity  to  construct  functional
interpretations in many different situations. It has been tested. The results emphasize
that the agent's action and the physical structure directly determine the function and
that this is not the case for intention or for the agent's purpose. They also indicate that
the absence of  immediate causes amplifies  the effect  of  the intention of the object's
creator.  The authors  go on to  propose two principles,  namely the "causal  proximity
principle" and the "causal updating principle". The causal proximity principle controls
causal reasoning about the object's functionality. Specifying the physical structure and
the  agent's  action  appropriately  is  sufficient  to  determine  functionality.  The  causal
updating principle  applies  when the immediate  causes  are  ambiguous  or  absent  and
individuals are required to make inferences on the basis of remote causes which then
mediate the determination of functionality. The objects used in this study were unknown
to the  participants  since  the  scenarios  specified their  intention,  their  purpose,  their
utilization and their structure. The scenarios made it possible to manipulate these four
types of information independently of one another. 
26 Let us illustrate some parts of  this  model  on the basis  of  the causal  relations which
underlie the judgment of the quality of a car, and more precisely the judgment of its
comfort (Dompnier, Cordier, Kirsche, & Lescop, 2006).
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Figure 1   Network of causal links between the features revealed by Dompnier et al. (2006) in the
conceptual representation of a car. All the features are related to the comfort feature 
27 The causes which are spatially the closest to the comfort feature are the features for which
this feature is the sole effect. These are the proximal causes of comfort. The more remote
causes, such as colors and seat upholstery for example, are also undoubtedly directly linked
to the comfort feature but also to another proximal cause: brightness. This is a first-order
remote cause. The two most distal causes are the seat trimmings and the accessibility of the
levers  of  the  steering-wheel. The  most  distal  causes  are  directly  linked  to  the  comfort
featurethrough the inference of a proximal cause. This is referred to as the causal updating
principle by Chaigneau et al. (2004): information concerning the efficiency of the suspension
makes it possible to arrive at a two stage inference concerning comfort by passing via the
feature felt vibrations. 
28 After  having  modeled  the  network  of  causal  relations  between  the  features  in  the
conceptual representation of an object, Cordier, Dompnier and Ros (submitted) tested the
analysis  of  the  position  of  the  feature  in  the  causal  network  in  a  judgment  task
(evaluation of the quality of described objects on a scale:).  The analysis of the factor
“position of the feature in the causal network” clearly indicates that the distal causes do
not seem to have a major impact on judgments, unlike the proximal and intermediate
causes. These results indicate that it is necessary to stress the importance of the task
context for the theoretical modeling of a causal network. 
 
To conclude
29 The ontological nature of the objects used in the experiments, within this complex system
of causal representations, could have an impact on the semantic coherence of the system
and the weight of its elements. This result does not confirm the idea that the coherence
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effect  (Rehder  &  Hastie,  2004;  Rehder  &  Burnett,  2005)  is  generalized  whatever  the
ontological  domain.  Other  factors  must  be  taken  into  account:  type  of  reasoning
(essentialist or teleological),  the individual’s prior beliefs,  and the type of tasks used.
However, a complete model of causal induction must be able to specify how novel causal
relations can be acquired even when specific prior knowledge is lacking. In the absence of
such prior knowledge,  can people use more general structural  information to form a
causal model with reference to an ontological domain? 
30 We do not perceive our world or external objects as a stream of unconnected elemental
features. Here, too, central processes act on the data to yield an organized view. Causal
induction  is  an  example  of  such  organizing  processes.  The  interest  of  theory-based
models lies in the way they focus on these causal links between features. Their value also
lies in the fact that they can be applied to a variety of domains such as folk theory of
society  (Hirschfeld,  2001),  the  interpersonal  context  of  rational  activities  (Bonnefon,
2007), marketing and advertising, medicine (Haslam & Ernst, 2002) and others. 
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NOTES
1.  The aim of some theories is to capture the probability with which the cause actually causes
the effects, for example causal power theory by Novick & Cheng, 2004; or causal model approach by
Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001.
2.  Causal Power is defined as the probability with which a candidate cause would produce an
effect  in  the  absence  of  any  background  causes.  It  is  proposed  that  causal  power  can  be
intuitively  computed  from  the  cause-effect  covariation  information  (Cheng  &  Novick,  1992;
Luhmann & Ahn, 2005; Perales & Shanks, 2008)
ABSTRACTS
The theory-based conceptions of categorization postulate the existence of a network of causal
relations between the features involved in object representations and consider that this network
underpins both judgments of category membership and inference production. The aim of this
article is to examine the proposed models (causal status, causal density) within the framework of
theory-based conceptions and indicate how they account for inferential processes. Finally, we
underline the importance of the task context, and of the role of the nature of the ontological
domain for the theoretical modeling of a causal network based on an asymmetrical, probabilistic
representation of causality. 
Les theories de la categorization fondées sur les connaissances postulent l’existence d’un réseau
de relations causales entre les traits impliqués dans les representations d’objets et que ce réseau
sous-tend à  la  fois  les  jugements  d’appartenance catégorielle  et  les  inferences.  Cet  article  se
focalise sur les processus d’induction. Son but est d’examiner les modèles proposés pour rendre
compte  des  processus  inférentiels  (modèle du  statut  causal,  de  la  densité  causale).  Nous
soulignons l’importance du contexte de la tâche et de la nature du domaine ontologique dans une
modélisation  théorique  d’un  réseau  causal,  basé  sur  une  représentation  multidéterminée  et
asymétrique de la causalité.
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